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Subversive elements, whether insurgent, terrorist, or criminal, all require a 
communication system to coordinate and control operations. The development of a 
clandestine communication system requires special considerations in the development of 
the nodes and links that are responsible for the transmission of information. A closure 
analysis of these processes, professionally referred to tradecraft, assists in the planning 
and development of a communication system to support or counter subversive operations.  
This thesis analyzes tradecraft as a communication system to identify the constraints and 
opportunities to which different technologies have proven useful and the strengths and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the technology employed by subversive 
elements to construct an efficient and secure organizational communication system. As in 
data communication, the efficiency of the system depends on the nodes that route 
messages and the links that connect them. To understand “the effects of the 
communication systems on messages ... the characteristics of the system must be known” 
(Thomas, 1988, p.2). When possible, the terminology familiar to data networks will be 
incorporated to assists in the clarification of a function and graphical renditions for visual 
comparisons. Several terms associated with data communication are applicable and 
descriptive in explaining the techniques and tradecraft of clandestine communication and 
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II. COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 
Formal communication systems control and direct the flow of information 
throughout an organization. These processes are needed to “disseminate and enforce 
organizational goals, rules, and regulations; coordinate the activities of organizational 
members in the accomplishment of organizational tasks; provide formal leaders with 
feedback about... the state of organizational activities; and socialize organization 
members into the culture of the organization” (Kreps, 1981, p.271). Organizations that 
exist in a dynamic and complex environment cannot easily sustain operations with static 
rules or policies and must continually adapt to changes in the environment. Within the 
subversive organization’s dynamic and complex environment the members’ motivation 
and commitment to organizational goals is in constant flux and the maintenance of which 
requires the leadership to continually influence the decisions and activities of the 
members. “The more an organization is people- and idea- oriented, the more important 
communication becomes” (Hall, 1972, p.271). This process of directing, influencing, 
controlling, and motivating is expedited with a communication channel that links the 
leadership to the subordinates by the most direct and shortest means possible. The 
building of this system is of importance to the leadership of all organizations and 
essential to subversive elements. “The importance of communication to secret activities 
cannot be over emphasized. It is the efficiency of the communication system which 
makes possible the rapid [information] procurement and dissemination” (Brown, 1976, 
p.66).  
The conditions imposed by a hostile environment and the necessity of the 
subversive organization to counteract these conditions requires that the channels used to 
alert elements, disseminate orders, and control operation be transmitted in a timely and 
reliable manner. “Direct supervision is the fastest and tightest means of coordination” 
(Mintzberg, 1993, p.141) between nodes and allows for the exchange of clear, accurate, 
timely, usable information. However, in large organizations direct exchange is not always 
practical and requires a modification of the communication process. The inclusion of 
additional nodes and links in the system increases the distance between elements and can 
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easily impede communication. Intuitively, responsiveness is the duration between the 
transmission of a directive and the initiation of action by the receiver. When defining the 
responsiveness of a communication system it is a factor of where the message is routed 
and the time necessary to complete the transmission. Mechanically, the responsiveness of 
the system depends on the reliability of the nodes to route messages to the appropriate 
recipient and the timeliness of a particular link to transmits the correct information.  
Though most subversive elements are not considered large by corporate 
standards, the desire to maintain security also requires the inclusion of additional nodes 
and links in the communication process. “Communication is, by definition, a relational 
one” (Hall, 1972, p.272) and direct communications between nodes establishes an 
association. Security is maintained by regulating direct communication between 
members.  This methodology commonly referred to as compartmentalization, limits the 
connectivity of the organization’s members and eliminates the redundancy in the 
communication network. Redundancy in communication is two fold: 1) it provides a 
“multiplicity of paths” (JP 6-0, 1995, p. II-6) linking any two network members, thus 
increasing the probability a message will reach the intended receiver, and 2) it is the 
“repeating of a message over different channels, in different forms, or over time” 
(Rogers, 1976, p.92).  Redundancy increases the accuracy of information and the 
reachability of any individual member by either direct or indirect connections. The 
number of routes between two nodes determines the connectivity of a network. The 
minimum number of nodes whose removal “results in a graph with two components” 
(Cravis, 1981, p.5) is the minimum cut-set of the networks. The subversive network is 
“organized so that if one element fails, the consequences on the total organization will be 
minimized” (Molnar, 1963, p.54). This minimization is possible by maintaining a 
minimum cut-set of one between nodes. As the security environment relaxes, the 
organization can broaden the connectivity to facilitate coordination and planning but in a 
high threat environment, the fewer links connecting organizational members, the fewer 
members that can be identified by any particular member during interrogation. 
4 
The development of an efficient clandestine communication network requires the 
continuing evaluation of the constraints, opportunities, contingencies, and problems 
(Khandwalla, 1977, p.328) created by the competitive environment to identify the best 
node or link to utilize in the appropriate situation. The efficient system requires the 
appropriate combination of nodes, the couriers, cut-outs, etc. responsible for the 
distribution of messages, and links, the means (written, radio, telephonic, etc.) by which 
this information is transferred. A thorough understanding of these components can assist 
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III. NODES  
Nodes are components in the system responsible for the routing and distribution 
of information. Not only does the communication system responsiveness depend on node 
reliability, the appropriate node utilized to complete a connection must conform to the 
constraints and opportunities of the environment. When selecting nodes for the system, 
the safety and dependability must both be evaluated. Safety is the ability of the node to 
perform its function without compromising the organization. Dependability encompasses 
the trustworthiness of the node to complete the function with an acceptable level of 
assurance for the organization. Nodes are the couriers and cut-outs responsible for the 
distribution of messages to the appropriate recipient node in the network.  
A. COURIERS 
Courier are  proven nodes in secret communication networks. The “use of 
couriers is probably the safest means of communication and transmission of information 
between various agents” (Molnar, 1966, p.103). The courier receives a message and 
delivers it to a specified individual or location. The detainment and the possible 
interception of the message can jeopardize the entire organization. The courier’s ability to 
safely transport a message through hostile terrain is a function of the quantity and quality 
of security forces and adversarial elements in route. Will the couriers remain undetected, 
do they have the proper documentation, and are there checkpoints at every street corner? 
Despite varying levels of threats in the area, the courier is a most dependable means of 
communication. Couriers return and provide the sender with the assurance that the 
message has been delivered in tact and may provide feedback from the recipient. Despite 
advances in communication technology the courier remains effective even in strictly 
policed societies. 
Simha Rotem (Kazik) joined the Zionist youth movement in 1942 and would later 
become the aid-de-camp for Yitzak Zuckerman (Antek), the leader of ZOB the Jewish 
Fighting Organization in Poland. Kazik participated in several subversive activities, one 
of which was courier for Antek. The ZOB courier duties were critical to bridging the gap 
between the organization and other resistance elements and the constituency in Poland. 
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Couriers were responsible for “maintaining contact with [Jewish] people in the camps 
and ghettoes... delivering money... forged documents... underground publications...[and] 
supplying weapons to places where uprisings were planned and prepared” (Kazik, 1994, 
p.67).  The courier minimizes the personal contact between the leadership and the 
subordinates by inserting an additional node into the communication channel. The courier 
eliminates the need for the leaders to expose themselves to hostile elements in the 
environment. Kazik’s position not only increased the security for “the commander of the 
ZOB throughout Poland” (Rotem, 1994, p.66) but also made him a competent lieutenant 
for the organization.  
Kazik’s functional capacity exceeded the normal duties of the courier, as he 
became a trusted member of ZOB. Kazik “was Antek’s deputy, and in that role [he] had 
to make decisions required by the circumstances at any given moment” (Rotem, 1994, 
p.67). Kazik was present for organizational meetings between Antek and the other 
branches of the Jewish Resistance, the Armia Krajowa (AK), the Polish Home Army, and 
the Armia Ludowa (AL), the People’s Guard. Kazik’s position in the organization 
permitted him access to the individuals and information to make him a more influential 
representative of Antek. Kazik’s contact with Antek maintained a short and direct line of 
communication between the leadership and the other branches, which assisted in the 
dissemination of directives. Kazik’s familiarity allowed messages to be verbally 
transmitted, which avoided the complications of composing and concealing written 
information or the memorization necessary by less informed couriers. When messages are 
passed through a series of nodes, the message is continually degraded. This degree of 
familiarity with organizational activities, members, and contacts can place significant risk 
for the organization. 
1. Bridges 
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Kazik established the communication bridge that linked Antek to the ZOB 
members and other resistance elements. A bridge “shares information ... and facilitates 
coordination” (Kreps, 1986, p.220) between networks. Underground leadership is 
typically isolated from the environment to limit exposure to hostile forces and delegates 
the supervision of operations to intermediaries, lieutenants and deputies. Structurally, a 
bridge is a “an organizational member who connects a [network] to which they belong 
with members of another [network]” (Kreps, 1986, p.220) and therefore included within 
the organizational boundaries that are created by the communication process. The bridge 
converses with other members, is involved in deliberations, and develops a high degree 
of organizational knowledge. The information acquired by the bridge increases his 
capacity to coordinate activities and influence subordinates. The Polish Resistance used 
the couriers extensively. The courier who is a member of the internal channels creates 
considerable security risks for the organization as they are constantly exposed to hostile 
forces and adversaries. The knowledge the courier has acquired can easily compromise 
the organization. The courier’s routine exposure must be continuously analyzed and 
equilibrium between communication and security maintained. 
 
Figure 1.   Network Bridge 
The network
bridge is a member of
‘A’s internal
communication process






Occupied Warsaw was a special environment that posed significant threats to the 
ZOB courier. Jews were not only pursued by Gestapo agents but were the targets of non-
sympathetic Poles as well. The “German’s internal security system was extensive ... and 
assisted by local residents” (Rotem, 1994, p.96). Blackmailers would attempt to extort 
goods from Jews in return for their safe passage in the Warsaw streets (Rotem, 1994, 
p.68).  These threats impacted the safety of completing a mission and were a 
consideration in assigning missions. “When a specific mission was assigned, we always 
9 
weighed carefully who had the best chance of performing it” (Kazik, 1994, p.67). The 
courier is constantly exposed to opposition forces and vulnerable to intercept and, 
therefore, must maintain the appearance of legitimacy to remain successful. Kazik’s 
successfully exploited opportunities that were created by the occupation environment 
within Warsaw. 
Proper documentation was a necessity to maneuver through the city and the 
countryside. The use of forged documents was common but still created a degree of risk. 
Kazik was native to Warsaw and presented himself not as a Jew from the surrounding 
countryside. Kazik’s obtained the official documentation required to reside outside the 
ghetto through associates in the Polish underground (Rotem, 1994, p.60-61). Kazik 
assumed the identity of a deceased Polish Aristocrat with the assistance of the department 
of records. Kazik was also familiar with Warsaw and the ghetto, unlike the individuals 
that were relocated from outside the city. These traits and the proper preparation 
increased the dependability of Kazik as a courier and deputy. The courier like other 
members of the organization must operate a conventional lifestyle to avoid conspicuous 
behavior. Therefore the use of individuals who can perform the duties of the courier in 
the conduct of normal activities assists in the disguise of clandestine activity. Kazik 
exploited the opportunities created by the environment. The access to official 
documentation, the Aryan appearance, and familiarity with the city allowed him to move 
with assurance through the city. When the constraints of the environment are such that 
one’s ability to move safely are minimized, other methods of employment should be 
adopted. 
The Armia Krajowa used women almost exclusively as couriers. These women 
“ensured the constant and accurate communications of the AK. They distributed the 
Underground press and publications” (Polish, 1999, p.1).  The courier was closely 
regulated to maintain safety because the ability for them to be compromised was 
significant in Poland. Molnar comments in reference to the Polish Home Army that “the 
problem of avoiding police suspicion was immense, and these couriers were usually 
uncovered after they had served a few months. In view of this, these women were not 
allowed to assume other duties in the underground, so as to limit the information they 
could be forced to disclose under interrogation” (Molnar, 1963, p.80). For the 
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communication network, this structural modification is referred to as a liaison; in the 
subversive world it is frequently called the cut-out. 
B. CUT-OUT 
The cut out is a fundamental structural feature of clandestine networks 
implemented to minimize association between cells and members by inserting an 
“intermediary who meets each agent separately and conveys messages back and forth” 
(Molnar, 1966, p.103). Kazik was a cut-out for Antek but the security afforded the 
leadership was not replicated in the organizational structure. A more secure methodology 
retains not only the protection of essential leaders but also the counsel within which he 
confides. The development of a liaison structure increases the security of the 
organization. The Viet Cong utilized cut-outs to limit exposure between the district and 
hamlet organizational members (Lanning, 1992, p.112). A VC communication-liaison 
officer captured in the fall of 1966 explained: 
The VC secretary received orders from the district 
secretary, who in turn sent messages to the cadre who were 
staying in the hamlet. In each hamlet there was a fixed 
place where I would come with my message. At that place 
there was a man who would know me. He was in touch 
with the cadres of that hamlet and he would deliver the 
orders to the cadre. I gave the message to this man, not to 
the cadre. I knew therefore, the fixed place and I knew this 
man, but I did not know the cadres. The cadres in turn, at 
some other time, went to another place to pick up the 
messages (Lanning, 1992, p.112). 
This method is straightforward, but inefficient. The district secretary dispatched a 
courier with a message. The courier would contact an intermediary in the hamlet who 
may have been a cadre member but was more likely an individual recruited to represent 
the cadre. For the organization, both the courier and the representative are neither 
members of the district or the hamlet communication network. Structurally speaking the 
roles of the courier and the representative can be considered liaison.  
1. Liaisons  
The hamlet representative was the liaison between the cadre and the district 
personnel. Liaisons are “organization members who connect two [elements] without 
themselves belonging to either one” (Kreps, 1986, p.220). The organization prevents 
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membership disclosure by relying on the liaison to represent the cadre. The liaison is only 
a node in the group’s external communication channels and not privy to internal 
deliberation and planning. The cadre members control what information the liaison can 
access by message content and use of encryption. “Because the representative’s 
vulnerable position as a contact...he is limited to this one duty and knows little about 
other aspects of the underground” (Molnar, 1963, p.81). The security of the organization 
is further increased with the replacement of the liaison with other switching mechanisms 
designed to route messages to the appropriate receiver without compromising 
organizational knowledge. 
The network liaison is a member of ‘A’s organization
but not of the internal communication process and has
controlled access to organizational knowledge. 
B 
C
Though leaders ‘B’ & ‘C’ still 
provide the network bridge for 
respective cells, ‘A’ uses a 
liaison to conduct 
communication between 
elements and limits the 
exposure of organizational 
knowledge.   
A 
Figure 2.   Liaisons 
Messages are transmitted through the system by a series of nodes and the links 
that connect them. How these nodes route the message to the appropriate receiver is a 
primary consideration of the system and the subject of this section. How the separate 
nodes are linked is a paramount importance and is the key to creating a functional system 
that transmits information in a timely and reliable manner. The assurance that a message 
has departed and arrived at a particular node requires feedback from the system and is 
most readily attained through a direct linkage. Indirect linkage limits the responsiveness 
of the system but increases the security by limiting association between nodes. The 
process by which this is possible in a communication network is through the reliance on 
switching mechanism that route messages to appropriate recipients. Communication 
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through a cut-out is either by establishing a temporary link between two nodes long 
enough to complete the transmission or the storage of the message until the next node 
becomes available to receive the message. When two nodes establish a link that 
completes the circuit between otherwise separate entities the message is transferred and 
the process is affirmed. The line switch is the most secure method in ensuring the 
message arrives to the correct location, but creates the danger of compromising two 
nodes at one ti   
ve drop, the switch is designed to reduce the conspicuousness of the message 
transfer. 
 provided an example of an exchange process in M. R. D Foot’s, The 
me.
a. Line Switch  
The line switch establishes a non-permanent connection between two 
nodes for a brief period of time to allow a message to be transferred. “A news dealer or a 
tobacconist might be used to receive and pass messages” (Brown, 1976, p.123) that 
would otherwise require contact between organization members that would arouse 
suspicion or disclose one’s identity. During the contact, a message, coded in an 
expression or concealed in an item, is transferred to the individual that presents the 
proper bona fides (a phrase, garb, or motion used to confirm one’s identity). This transfer 
requires some harmonization but is dependable and reasonably safe to execute frequently 
as the switching nodes actions are disguised in legitimate activities. Sometimes referred 
to as a li
The British DF circuits during the Second World War used line switches 
to assist in the transfer of escaping prisoners of war, downed airmen, and agents between 
safe houses located along the European escape lines. DF operatives would hide newly 
acquired passengers in designated safe houses and notify a switch that was responsible 
only for the receiving an arrival message and transferring that information to the next 
node. The DF operative would escort the passengers to a pre-arranged contact location to 
be picked up by the next escort. The transfer of the message and the passenger were 
dependent upon the contact initiated by the receiving node and therefore the passenger 
may conduct the contact procedure several times before an actual transfer. A former DF 
circuit operative
SOE in France: 
13 
One agent passes a message in simple code to the cut-out; it 
might be a book seller, saying, “I have two volumes of 
Anatole France that need binding; can you arrange it for 
me?’ The cut-out holds the message till approached by the 
next agent down the line, who rings up and asks, ‘Have you 
any Anatole France in stock?’, and will infer from the 
answer, ‘Yes, two volumes have just come in’, that there 
r through covert means, written 
communicatio
are two escaper to be collected from the circuit safe house 
in the Boulevard Anatole France (Foot,1966,  p.94).  
When the receiver was certain that the situation was safe to transfer 
personnel along the lines, the escort would contact the switch and request whether or not 
personnel were in need of transport. After receiving an affirmative answer from the clerk, 
the escort would contact the passenger in waiting at the appropriate rendezvous location 
and complete the transfer. Other switches did not rely on the verbal transfer of 
information but used written and visual signals to alert personnel. In Lyons, a safe house 
owner would send a personal letter with the necessary information hidden in the contents 
to a fictitious resident in town. The postmaster recognizing the name would route the 
message to the local cobbler. “The cobbler put a particular shoe ... in one corner of the 
shop window” (Foot, 1966, p.95). A courier would pass the window daily and receive the 
signal and subsequently move the passenger to the next safe house.  Though the 
transmission of information can experience a considerable delay between nodes, the 
process is reasonably safe and dependable. Had the bookstore been under surveillance the 
clerk could redirect either node with an answer that avoided suspicion. Though the Lyons 
postmaster could deliver messages either as a daily duty o
n can be transmitted more surreptitiously.   
Pass. When the ability to camouflage a message transfer in a legitimate 
exchange does not avail itself, the opportunity to conceal the transmission must be seized. 
Unlike an exchange with the tobacconist, there may be no justification for an encounter 
between two nodes and any apparent contact can be incriminating; therefore, crowds and 
confusion are incorporated to mask the pass.  Occasionally referred to as the ‘brush pass’ 
the technique offers “a brief encounter where something is passed between [operatives]” 
(Mendez, 1999, p.344). Antonio Mendez, the former Chief of Disguises for the Central 
Intelligence Agency, described his first surveillance training exercise when he and his 
partners lost their surveillance targets that “’brushed’ by one another and exchanged 
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packages or dropped a message in each other’s pocket or shopping bag, undetected by 
surveillance” (Mendez, 1999, p. 66). The pass establishes a momentary link between two 
nodes that allows the abrupt exchange of information. Structurally, this technique is no 
different than the previous telephonic or letter exchanges but does create the opportunity 
to transfer an item or a larger quantity of information directly to another node and avoids 
the caching of a message for recovery at a later time by the recipient. Such an exchange 
can prove very difficult to detect in large crowds with small items and can be a safe 
method of communication if coordinated and practiced. The pass is quite dependable as it 
“keeps any sensitive message in the hands of the operatives only – it is not left anywhere 
or with anyone” (Myers, 1991, p.41). To attain a higher degree of communication 
effectiveness, the organization must establish interpersonal contacts in a secure and 
concealed loca
 is the only location through which the 
leadership can
tion.  
Safe House. The safe house is not a communication node per se but has 
been incorporated in systems analysis as a cover for such activities. “A ‘safe house’ (one 
where the people were friendly and willing to take the risk of harboring an agent or 
subagent) might be necessary to assist in concealment” (Brown, 1976, p.123) of escapees, 
conferences, or training of members. In the selection of a safe house, the organization 
should “try to avoid neighborhoods where persons noted for anti-regime activities reside, 
for they are likely to be under government surveillance and ... might arouse suspicion ... 
and also, places near the homes of block wardens” (Molnar, p.1963, p.75). ZOB used the 
safe house extensively to conceal resistance activities and hide Jewish residents. The 
couriers would visit the houses regularly but not excessively as “every house in Warsaw 
had a concierge who gave information to the police on everything that went on in the 
house ... [and] investigated strangers to find out which of the tenants the stranger was 
visiting” (Rotem, 1994, p.97). The safe house is more than a place to house pursued 
people; for urban organizations, the safe house
 influence the members directly.  
The communication opportunity provided by the safe house is decisive to 
the organization. Whether an apartment in the ghetto or a camp in the mountains, these 
sanctuaries are the only headquarters for local groups where the leadership can establish 
and maintain the organization’s direction, which, in turn, is only effective with member 
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cooperation. Leaders “depend on the development of effective interpersonal relationships 
with other organization members to help gather information and elicit cooperation” 
(Kreps, 1986, p.168). The courier lines of Tito’s resistance forces allowed “Partisan 
leaders [to] safely visit the regional political and military headquarters, coordinate their 
political and military activities, evaluate on site the competence and loyalty of regional 
leaders, replace those who didn’t measure up, and ensure that directives from Tito and the 
Central Committee were faithfully followed” (Lindsay, 1993, p.65). The use of a meeting 
area like a safe house cannot be relied on continually and must be rotated to avoid the 
attention of hostile forces. “Resistance movements must maintain several safe houses in 
the same city or district in order to hold conferences, or to go underground temporarily or 
permanently” (von Dach Bern, 1965, p.109). When the constraints of the environment do 
not afford the opportunity to exchange information directly, the message switch can 
transfer information between nodes. 
b. Message Switching 
Message switches receive and hold a message until retrieved by the 
correct agent. Frequently called a drop, dead drop, letterbox, etc. the switch may require a 
special container to conceal the contents and blend with the environment. The switch 
replaces the liaison with a temporary storage facility to retain the message until picked 
up. Stanislav Lunev, former GRU Colonel and Soviet defector, used a container that 
replicated a Coca Cola can that he retrieved from the roadside. “It was like one of those 
cans with a screw lid that people buy in specialty stores to stash their jewelry and thwart 
burglars, except this one was designed by the GRU to destroy its contents should it be 
opened by someone other than the GRU” (Lunev, 1998, p.144). The device was dropped 
at the specified site at which Lunev visited in accordance with a designated time 
schedule. The message switch institutes a compromise between the dependability and 
safety of the mechanism. The switch is vulnerable not only to adversaries but damage in 
general. The device may be unknowing removed by passers-by or garbage collections 
and must be placed to avoid these dilemmas. The OSS used what was referred to as 
“inanimate letter drops for the actual transmission of intelligence reports over great 
distances... An agent might place intelligence material at a designated spot on a railroad 
car or locomotive...[to be] removed by a confederate in another city and forwarded” 
16 
(Brown, 1976, p.123). The emplacements of these switches are “places such as telephone 
booths or washrooms where an individual commonly goes alone without suspicion” 
(Molnar, 1963, p.103). However, message switches do not have to be concealed in the 
thoroughfares of everyday activity and can be at locations away from a society’s natural 
lines of travel.
 have relied on proper camouflage in the urban or rural terrain to remain 
concealed. 
  
When the Dong Loa Dong moved to regain control of South Vietnamese 
villages in the late 50’s, the first objective was to establish a clandestine cell within the 
targeted village to further develop the movement. Before entering a village, the Party 
would conduct a survey to determine the village’s overall disposition and level of 
government control. Based upon these findings the cadre would attempt to recruit a few 
new members to the Party who would form the Civil Affairs Committee.  The survival of 
the Committee required a communication system that would maintain security for both 
the personnel and the higher headquarters. When the cell needed to contact higher 
headquarters, the message was delivered to a message switch that was usually a “clay jar 
buried in the ground and carefully camouflaged. A courier from the district committee 
would later empty the ‘mailbox,’ carry the message to yet another clay jar near the 
district Party Committee headquarters, deposit them, and then leave” (Andrews, 1973, 
p.49-50). Directives from the District were transmitted using the same methodology. Not 
all switches
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Francois Suttill parachuted into France early in October of 1942 to “re-
create an active circuit in and around Paris” (Foot, 1966, p.198) for the Special 
Operations Executive (SOE). The SOE began infiltrating agents into France in the Spring 
of Forty-one to organize resistance networks in preparation for the invasion of Europe. 
Suttill was provided contacts by the CARTE circuit to begin setting up operations to 
recruit and organize the new PROSPER circuit. The networks would collect intelligence, 
distribute firearms and equipment, train resistance personnel, and conduct sabotage of 
German lines of communication. Suttill’s made his first CARTE contact with Germaine 
Tambour in October. Suttill had been impressed with Tambour and arranged to “used her 
house as a letter-box and rendezvous” (Foot, 1966, p.309) for PROSPER members. The 
switch located at the Tambour’s residence was now accessed by Suttill, his two radio 
operator Amps and Norman, his courier, Andre’ Borrel, and Peter Churchill, another 
contact (Foot, 1966, p.309) presumably for correspondence. Additionally, these 
individuals, minus Churchill, were also using another apartment in the building as a 
switch along with six other SOE operatives (Foot, 1966, p.309). The Tambour residence 
and the building as a whole were now servicing ten SOE personnel, some of whom were 
members of another circuit. Unbeknownst to PROSPER, the courier for the CARTE 
network had fallen asleep on the Marseilles to Paris train carrying the names, addresses, 
telephone numbers, and appearances of over two hundred CARTE personnel which were 
subsequently taken by an Abwehr agent (Foot, 1966, p.205). The probable disclosure of 
the Tambour residence would have easily compromised the individuals accessing the 
residence to retrieve messages or attend meetings. Tambour was arrested the following 
April and virtu
 the 
process must be thoroughly analyzed and planned to integrate the proper resources.  
 regulated by the activity 
within which they are disguised and can be difficult to detect. 
ally all of the PROSPER network was rolled up in the following months.  
The residence concealed the switch from observation of the delivery or 
retrieval of messages but placed at risk several organizational members by allowing 
multiple members to access the identical switch. Foot points out that as a guide, “a cut-
out ought to be able to give away only, at worst, the people on either side of him or her in 
the system” (Foot, 1977, p.41). The overall safety of the switch and its dependability 
cannot override the fundamental practices of regulated association. The opportunities 
provided by the apartment did not consider the constraints imposed by the Paris security 
forces’ capabilities.  To utilize a single node to route messages to multiple nodes
c. Queuing Switch 
The efficiency of a communication system increases with the ability of a 
single node to maintain and route numerous messages in waiting correctly. This queuing 
switch can have significant security concerns as well as repercussions and demand 
special consideration in a network. Clandestine switches are
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Figure 3.   Queuing Switch 
The ‘queuing switch’ increases the
efficiency of the system by using a
single node to route several
messages. As possible with the
delivery woman, the individual
conducting the transfer process may
be ignorant of the message contents
or even the message its self,
significantly increasing security but
lowering the dependability of the
delivery system. 
During the early 1950’s Col. Ed Lansdale was working in the Philippines 
as an advisor to Ramon Magsaysay, Secretary to the National Defense, when a member 
of the Communist Politburo operating clandestinely in Manila “let slip a clue as to [the 
method] ... communications between Politburo members were convey[ed]” (Lansdale, 
1991, p.63). The Politburo incorporated a woman courier as a switching mechanism to 
transfer messages around Manila. The woman “delivered baskets of food; hidden in the 
baskets were secret messages for distribution to the members” (Lansdale, 1991, p.63). 
Details as to the frequency of delivery or scheduled verses on call were not available, but 
either of these techniques utilizes a system with a self-imposed “user-to-user delay ... that 
depends largely on the queuing” (Cravis, 1981, p.85) method or simply the delivery 
sequences. This store-and-forward switch regulates the flow of information throughout 
the Politburo. Surveillance of the delivery service established an “identifiable link 
between the top members of a clandestine group” (Lansdale, 1991, p. 63) and resulted in 
the arrest of several members and the confiscation of documents concerning activities, 
meetings, and future plans. The communication channel should appear as “conventional 
and as open as possible” (Molnar, 1966, p.73) so as not to attract the authority’s attention 
but incorporate written messages to maintain accuracy or limit the exposure of 
operational concern to third parties; the delivery woman. 
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The switch routed messages throughout Manila under the guise of a 
legitimate delivery service. However, the centralization of the mechanism aided in the 
identification of several Politburo members. The maintenance of a dedicated system with 
a low failure rate, standardized procedures, and the capability to prevent interception can 
ensure the delivery of information to proper receivers but “is not suitable for immediate 
exchange of messages and replies” (Cravis, 1981, p. 85). The ability to transmit 
information in a timely manner is the corner stone of the automated switch. 
d. Automated Switches 
Automated switches, made possible through data communication and the 
Internet, are some of the “easiest and most secure” (Wettering, 2001, p.346) ways to 
transfer messages between agents covertly in a reliable and timely manner. Worldwide 
information systems facilitate clandestine communication with ease of encryption or 
concealment (which is fundamentally a means to link nodes and will be discussed further 
under written mediums), multiple access storage and retrieval nodes, and virtual 
anonymity. Frederick L Wettering, a retired Central Intelligence Operations Officer, 
points out that the Internet has “made easier the method and techniques of espionage” 
(Wettering, 2001, p.348). Internet services have created the ability of an organization to 
establish switches that can be accessed remotely and in anonymity. An Internet Bulletin 
Board System (BBS) can be established with over the counter software and open to 
access from one’s home, business, library or Internet café with any personal computer. 
“Computer bulletin boards could be used to post messages, [send automatic notifications, 
or conduct electronic file transfers of encrypted data] between agents” (Wettering, 2001, 
p.348) while maintaining password protection. Web pages, more frequently used for the 
dissemination of propaganda, can allow controlled or secret access to additional sites that 
provide organizational information to be utilized in the execution of operation. However, 
just as these switches are electronically accessible from remote locations, they are easily 
monitored when targeted.  
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A centralized server that controls access to all files maintains the 
automated switch, whether a BBS or a web page. User attempting to access the switch 
can be scanned by systems (Carnivore, Omnivore, etc.) integrated into the server and a 
record of the exchange. “Security agencies monitor messages through the service 
provider” (Wettering, 2001, p.348). These devices scan exchanges looking for specific 
features, works, encryption, etc. and isolated the identified messages for analysis later. 
The identification of the nodes either sending and posting information or the retriever can 
be readily attained. Despite the vulnerabilities, the sites offer the organization an 
efficiency of communication that is difficult to replicate outside of the Internet. An 
efficient communication node or link is almost by definition one that can allow two-way 
exchange between multiple nodes simultaneously. No line, message, or queued switching 
process can transfer the quantity of information to various nodes as timely, reliably, or 
securely as these sites. Wettering also identified the increased uses of peer-to-peer file 
sharing applications like Napster as devices that can easily support clandestine 
communication. These peer-to-peer programs support “communication between 
computers (mainly trading files...) without going through a server (service provider) and 
with perfect anonymity” (Wettering, 2001, p.348). Whether an organization can establish 
the centralized inventory control system that’s allows one to search for and access a 
particular file or whether particular files can be made available and transferable but 
cloaked in a coded name of otherwise incomprehensible letters or with an embedded data 
is beyond the scope of this paper but Wettering points out probably the most significant 
advantage of the Internet which is anonymity. 
Internet services abound with the ability to create a temporary or 
permanent mailbox with no requirement for one to verify his identification. One can use 
several identities to send and receive information continually or once. The use of 
‘anonymous re-mailers’ can allow one access to the Internet sites from one’s residence 
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IV. LINKS  
The particular means by which to link nodes is generally viewed as a question of 
practicality in open communication but for the subversive it is the complexity of the 
contents and the consequences of the means utilized that are the deciding factors in a 
medium’s selection. Complex messages are employed for detailed instructions and 
operational concepts that cannot be translated through a series of cut-outs and brief, 
coded statements. Complex messages may require lengthy documentation, prolonged 
phone conversations, or interactive Internet web pages. The consequences of selecting a 
means is not limited to the ramification of message compromise, but also the resources 
that must be committed to the preparation and transmission process. Urgency may 
demand a radio transmission lasting ten minutes, the consequences of which are the hasty 
departure and relocation of the equipment to a new concealment location to avoid the raid 
made possible by direction finders. All mediums are vulnerable to interception and 
require messages be prepared to counter this weakness. A courier may be interdicted but 
the concealed message is not intercepted unless discovered. The discovered message 
should be incomprehensible due to encryption and/or the courier’s ignorance. In an effort 
to make the message concealable or reduce the encryption process, information can be 
omitted and distorted. Distortion, “the transformation of the meaning of a message by 
changing its content, [and] Omission, the deletion of all or part of a message” (Roger and 
Agarwala-Rogers, 1976, p. 93) is the consequence and the guiding principles in the 
selection of many clandestine links. The telephone, radio, mail, messages, computers, etc. 
are common methods of linking the nodes and are typically the target of counter-
intelligence efforts because of their ease of accessibility. The composition of these 
messages to prevent the revelation of information to ones adversary is the subject of this 
section.  
A. WRITTEN 
Written communication provides leaders with the opportunity to transmit complex 
information. For the courier, written communication demands first and foremost either 
the concealment of the message to prevent disclosure, or the disguise to prevent scrutiny. 
The recognition that there is a difference between concealment and disguise is not to 
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assign another classification to techniques but to identify that each has a separate purpose 
that should be considered in the preparation of the message. Though the differences can 
be ambiguous, as some techniques could easily be classified in either, both are markedly 
different from encryption, which is necessary to maintain confidentiality and the second 
line of defense.  “One obvious way to conceal messages is to memorize them. Messages 
that must be written can be concealed by the messenger on his person or they can be 
either coded or integrated into innocuous documents like letters. Disguised messages are 
less liable to discovery than concealed ones” (Molnar, p. 1963, p.77). Memorization has 
its purpose but as discussed previously, the consequences of the procedure must be 
weighed in so far as its capacity to deliver clear and accurate information is limited and 
thus procedures such as invisible inks, disguised messages, field encryptions and 
reduction techniques are of such importance.   
1. Invisible Inks 
Invisible inks have been used for centuries and were likely superceded by the 
development of the microdot and photographic reduction techniques (Mendez, 1999, 
p.223). A written message in an ink that requires the development by a receiver with the 
appropriate solution allows members to use ordinary appearing documents to conceal the 
message. The message could be included on personal letters, receipts or bills, etc. The 
Special Operation Executive taught several techniques that required only over the counter 
medication that could be procured without arising suspicion. “Most trained agents knew 
about secret inks; so did most good security officers. At a careful control, a patrolman 
would sit at a table with a couple of pots of secret-ink-developer and a brush ... [or] a 
magnifying class [that] would probably reveal the supposedly invisible pen strokes” 
(Foot, 1977, p.99). These inks could prove useful but were time consuming and limited in 
their ability to transmit complex information. The concoction of lemon juice or goats 
milk has been replaced with sympathetic inks readily available from specialty shops in 
pen and liquid form. These inks are primarily designed for the quick identification of 
equipment, test answer keys, or an impediment to criminal activities and are easily 




2. Disguised Letter 
The insertion of operational information into a seemingly innocent personal letter 
was a difficult task but attainable given the proper time. The concept required a pre-
arranged process that identified particular positions in the letter from which the words 
were extracted and re-consolidated into a comprehendible message. The Barn Code was 
used by SOE agents to conceal internal network communication in Europe and required 
no elaborate devices or compromised any official encryption methods. Lorraine gives a 
detailed description of the technique but will only receive a cursory overview here. 
The Barn Code conceals the message in an ordinary appearing letter that contains 
a key located at a specific position in the first paragraph. The key was used to construct a 
numerical decipher chart into which the second paragraph was transcribed. The message 
was reconstructed by extracting the words from each column in numerical order and the 
corresponding row. Particular bits of information that would be obvious even in the letter 
would be replaced with the letter ‘A’ and encrypted using the Playfair Cipher in the 
postscript. Encrypted messages would require additional pre-designated word positions 
from which the first letter of each word would be extracted and decrypted. “Although this 
system is long and it required a lot of effort to draw up a plausible letter, it is practically 
impervious to analysis” (Lorraine, 1972, p.78). The Bar Code and similar methods 
reduced the demand for the ever-incriminating encryption but doesn’t eliminate it from 
clandestine communication. 
3. Encryption 
Encryption and coding are frequently mixed and must be clarified for further 
discussion. The encryption of information is the mixing of letters and symbols to make 
the message incomprehensible. Codes are used to represent particular bits of information. 
Line switches use codes to affect an exchange; ‘two books’ was synonymous for ‘two 
passengers’ and didn’t attract unwarranted attention. Links require encryption to limit the 
information that can be extracted from intercepted messages. Historically the 
development of encryption devices has been paramount to the successful transmission of 
secret military and diplomatic messages but has been inapplicable to clandestine 
communication as the necessity to conceal the equipment and the security risks that arise 
from a system’s compromise have deemed the items inappropriate for use by subversives. 
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However, the inaccessibility of encryption devices did not eliminate the requirement and 
promoted the use of other methods to maintain confidentiality of information.  
a. Playfair Cipher 
The Playfair was developed before the turn of the century and used during 
World War I. The Playfair was based on a memorized line that was converted into a 5X5 
square from which the encrypted letters were drawn. The cipher was easy to use and 
required no special equipment beyond pencil and paper. However, the shortness of the 
encryption key allowed the identification of patterns in the encrypted text and made the 
encrypted message readily decipherable. Later developments introduced transposition 
and double transposition, which amounted to shuffling the plain text around in 
accordance with a specific numerical key. Transposition security was further enhanced 
with the distribution of a fixed key imprinted on a silk handkerchief to communication 
personnel. The essential concept behind ciphers development was the pursuit of a system 
that allowed for encryption in a timely and efficient manner while realizing a higher 
degree of security. Eventually the one-time pad was developed which significantly 
improved both the security and efficiency of encryption.  The Key is placed in the first boxes of the square and completed with the remaining alphabets (J omitted). Two–letter groups are encrypted
using the following method. 
• Two letters in the same column are encrypted with the letter directly below. 
• Two letters in the same row are encrypted with the letters directly to the right. 
• Letters not in the same col. or row are encrypted with the letter directly opposite in the diagonal created by the two letters.  
 
    
 
C O N T E 
M P R A Y 
B D F G H 
I/J K L Q S 
U V W X Z 






Wa sh in gt on 
 
Encryption: 
XR ZS LC QA NT 
 
The cipher provided organizations an
encryption system for internal
communication but the use of a repeating key
made the cipher readily breakable. Security
of use would require frequent changing of the
key and the acknowledgement that security
was only a factor of the time it took to break
the cipher when messages were intercepted. 
b. One-Time Pad 
The one-time pad entered operations in September 1943 and remains in 
use today. The one-time pad used a table containing twenty-six lettered columns for each 
key letter and in each column, the twenty-six letters of the alphabet and the 
corresponding encryption. The users were provided a key that was used to encrypt plain 
text in accordance with the table and subsequently destroyed after each use. The one-time 
pad is  “extremely quick and easy system, [that] does not require constant attention, and 
does not generate many errors ... [and] is mathematically unbreakable” (Lorraine, 1972, 
p.74). Much of the reliance on field expedient encryption techniques has been replaced 
by computer-generated methods. 
c. Computer Generation 
The computer has increased the ability to intercept and decipher encrypted 
messages but it has also assisted in the development of encryption methods by legitimate 
and subversive elements. Most individuals are familiar with Phil Zimmerman’s Pretty 
Good Privacy (PGP), an encryption program that was available to most Internet 
subscribers in the past, but there are also other techniques that can be developed with the 
computers random number generator. Most personal computer random generators utilize 
the internal clock to create a series of characters that can be used to develop an 
encryption key for the one-time pad if needed. Though the PC methods have their 
weakness, the accessibility of an individual/computer capable of decrypting the message 
is ultimate target of all encryption processes. 1 
4. Reduction 
The reduction of a message’s size can aid in the concealment and decrease the 
probability of detection during a search. The development of films and microdots has 
been utilized in the espionage business frequently, but is not necessarily a viable option 
for subversive elements. Though the methods can be improvised and replicated using 
certain equipment, the possession of such devices requires concealment and sufficient 
facilities. The limitations of an individual’s ability to reduce messages without access to 
                                                 
1 Meyers discusses some techniques to develop an encryption key for a one use which are credible. He 
includes a program written by Ken Balch which manipulates the internal clock time and uses the new 
number to generate a random number.  
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special equipment has traditionally been a factor of the amount of additional information 
that can be omitted from the message while still retaining legibility.  The result is the 
marginalizing of a means selected for capacity to transmit complex and detailed 
information. However, the process can allow the messenger to remain ignorant of 
contents minimizing the consequences of the operation. “The well worn trick of 
inscribing the message on a thin, tight roll of paper, inserted into a cigarette with a 
needle, usually worked well” (Foot, 1977, p.112) and would attract little attention if 
discarded or delivered to designated ash tray for removal by the net node. Photo-static 
reduction equipment and the accessibility of these devices have significantly improved 
the opportunity for concealment, as do computer-generated messages that can be 
produced in virtually any legible size. Technological improvements in data storage and 
the proliferation of concealment devices have made message transport easier but the 
consequences of interception still remain detrimental to the organization.  
In the Hiep Hoa village, the Vietcong maintained a “clear chain of command, 
carefully compartmented so that one member’s knowledge of the hierarchy was often 
limited to one contact man” (Herrington, 1997, p.35). However, when the security 
environment subsided or the organization’s control of the region expanded, the ability for 
members to coordinate overtly increased. When ‘Hai Chua’ defected from the Vietcong, 
as the village secretary and highest-ranking Vietcong in the Hiep Hoa, he brought 
knowledge of the infrastructure established in the village of about 4000 residents. Stuart 
A. Herrington, working with Operation Phoenix, initiated a series of interviews with Hai 
Chua to identify members and activities. However, Chua was concerned with his personal 
safety and was not interested in providing an abundance of information to the program. 
Chua would frequently explain, “that he had been expelled from his post as a village 
secretary several months earlier, and for this reason, he didn’t know much about his 
former comrades’ situation” (Herington, 1997, p.19). Herrington was also able to contact 
one of Hai Chua subordinates who had rallied several months earlier but neither of the 
two former Viet Cong would contribute accurate reliable information.  
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One night a patrol ambushed a courier who dropped his message pouch while 
escaping. The enclosed documentation provided Herrington with the information he 
needed to accurately question Chua and the other Viet Cong.  The documents “clearly 
belonged to the village’s Vietcong security chief ... [and identified] names of the village 
guerrilla unit ... government informants ... and key members of the village revolutionary 
committee” (Herrington, 1997, p.19-20). The information Herrington needed to 
reconstruct the village infrastructure was now replicated in multiple locations within the 
communication network. 
Accurate information requires redundancy in communication to provide alternate 
sources, confirmation, and reiteration. “Redundancy is the repeating of a message over 
different channels, in different forms, or over time” (Rogers, 1976, p.92). Indifferent to 
one’s relationship to the networks, an insider like Chua or an outsider like Herrington, an 
accurate picture of the village infrastructure must be attained from multiple sources. A 
single channel can only handle a limited amount of information and is therefore subject to 
distortion and omission. The multiplicity of connections allow for the crosscheck of the 
informant reports and the confirmation of memberships. When information “is replicated 
at several locations in the network [it] can be [readily] recovered” (JP 6-0, 1995, II-6), 
and poses significant risk to the organization. Though not all individuals serve as 
centralized nodes, the knowledge that any particular non-isolated node maintains can 
provide an entry point into the communication network.  
District security was maintained by limiting the
connectivity between the village cadre and the district
leadership. A ‘cut-set’ of one minimizes the connectivity
between nodes and reduces the reachability of an individual




Herrington was able to
develop an accurate
depiction of the VC
infrastructure.   
Figure 4.   Hiep Hoa Village 
Though the Hiep Hoa network was compromised through a redundancy of links 
and information, the district command was easily isolated from further damage by 
utilizing a single communication link between nodes. In the absence of multiple links 
between the district and the village, commanders must rely on one particular path to 
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transmit and confirm information reports. The transfer of detailed and complex 
information through multiple links and nodes requires a written communication to ensure 
accuracy. As in the Hiep Hoa example, the reliance on written documentation can 
significantly endanger clandestine operations. To reduce the probability of compromise, 
networks net reliable switching mechanisms to route information to the proper receiver. 
B. TELEPHONE 
The reliability and accessibility of the telecommunication networks allowed 
leaders to retain an influential link to organizational members from a distance that has 
traditionally required face-to-face interpersonal conversation. Whether a pay booth or a 
video conference call, the phone offers the individual a channel that can readily transmit 
messages with the proper informational and emotive overtones. However, the 
communication infrastructure essential to integrating local and international channels has 
increased the opportunities for surveillance and emplaced its own constraints on the 
operational personnel. The vulnerability to surveillance and the accessibility of the 
system has required the implementation of operational techniques to incorporate the 
efficiency of the telephone system. “Telephones are used in an emergency, the individual 
goes to a pay station and uses a pre-arranged code” (Molnar, 1966, p.103).   
There have been times when the phone can be utilized with a higher degree of 
safety. The manipulation of the network can provide the deception necessary to prevent 
the direct identification of participants.  
Helen Astrup had lived in Oslo for seven years before the Nazis occupied it in 
April of 1940. Astrup joined the Joessing Resistance the following year through social 
contacts. The group she worked with, Frognerveien, was contacted by the telephone and a 
pre-arranged code.  
Our telephone number was in fact no number at all. It was 
what was called a ‘spare’ at the automatic exchange, and 
the operator there could pick up the call and answer it. 
Contacts we wanted could be passed on to the ordinary 
telephone at Frognerveien, while those it seemed best to 
avoid could be stopped. The number could never be traced 
to anyone, anywhere (Astrop & Jacot, 1954, p.203). 
The exact mechanics of this procedure may not be discernible but the inclusion of 
an unassigned jack at the central switch inserted an intermediary node into the channel. 
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The switchboard operator conducted the initial caller screening and forwarded 
appropriate callers. The cell could have simply been assigned a spare jack at the 
exchange that only certain operators were familiar with or the call could have been routed 
through a spare jack before connecting to the Frognerveien location. Regardless of the 
systems details, the opportunities created by the resistance personnel’s unfettered access 
to the telephone exchange significantly improved the groups contact security procedures. 
The recruitment of post and phone personnel to gain access to legitimate communication 
networks was not uncommon during World War II, but is not the only way to manipulate 
the telephone system. 
Europe has frequently provided sanctuary for Middle Eastern subversives in 
hiding. The international calls from Europe to the Middle East are frequently intercepted 
in search of information. In an attempt to bypass interception efforts, Nabil Maksumi, a 
member of the Ahmed Jibril’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General 
Command, set up a telephone relay on Cyprus “that allowed European agents to talk 
directly to Jibril through the link” (Bell, 1999, p.160). Maksumi’s Cyprus switch was an 
intermediary node that concealed the Germany - Syria connection. Unfortunately for 
Maksumi, Cyprus has frequently been utilized as a staging area for terrorist activities and 
all international phone calls in and out of Cyprus were monitored. The connection 
between the Germany - Cyprus and Cyprus - Syria was identified and intercepted (Bell, 
p.160). Other elements have been more fortunate in the communication realm as they 
have had a better understanding of the situation than Maksumi. 
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ation.  
Maksumi established a switch in Cyprus
designed to avoid the regular intercept operations
conducted on the direct links between Syria and Europe.
A ‘house’ with two or three lines could receive a call
and conduct an in-house transfer to connect with a
second line to the appropriate destin
Figure 5.   Clandestine Switch 
The reliability of the telephone system has promoted its use in maintaining 
communication with members. However, Italy’s Red Brigade lacked competence in the 
local system and opted to use international lines to talk locally and bypassed the local 
security constraints imposed to control subversive activity. “The Brigade Rosse ... 
avoided the local Italian telephone system by recourse to the international system: when 
in Rome to talk to the Roman Brigade rosse one needed to call Toronto in Canada and so 
be connected back to Rome through a link that, being international, tended to work, 
unlike the local Italian system, and which was not monitored by the Italian security forces 
who were seeking terrorist in Rome not Toronto” (Bell, 1999, p.159-160). The 
circumvention of interception strategies is not always necessary and can be minimized by 
rotating phones regularly.    
Though expansive, utilization of the telecommunication system to transmit 
confidential information requires the structuring of activities around the existing access 
nodes. For example: The use of one’s residential or business telephone can easily 
establish the relationship between two actors; to avoid this dilemma, the members may 
conduct calls between exterior phones only. A thoroughly designed communication plan 
would include a rotation of nodes so as to avoid establishing suspicious patterns. One’s 
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daily activities must coincide with pre-arranged phones to maintain contacts. However, 
even rotations and switching, the lack of assurance that a conversation is not intercepted 
compels the use of codes and argot that can only be vaguely understood by an adversary 
and tend to distort or omit information. Such a process is not always feasible and limits 
the usability of the phone to sending and receiving concise messages that only serve to 
alert the receiver of a situation and omit practical details. Once again the concept of 
disguising one’s activities as normal behavior reduces the individual’s probability of 
attracting unnecessary attention: for example, the calling of a hotel may inquire about a 
specific room’s availability, or a restaurant’s menu items. As in the DF circuit’s routing 
process  “competent agents ... took care always to use café call-box telephones ... and to 
get away from the instrument promptly after making the call” (Foot, 1966, p.95). 
Figure 6.   Telecommunication Access 
Within a given telephone system there
exists several public access nodes
connected to a centralized switch and
system through which an individual can
establish a direct link to another associate. 
The ‘parasitic interconnect’ allows one
access to the system without the reliance on
an identifiable number and location but still
requires the planning and coordination to
communicate with other anonymous nodes.
Anonymous in the sense the phone one is
attempting to contact is not assigned to any
particular individual.  
To do so effectively, the
appropriate call numbers,
contact times, and locations
must be planned. A well-
coordinated communication
plan can permit the
transmission of information
without arousing suspicion. 
In his book SPYCOMM, Lawrence Myers offers some methods to attain “a 
parasitic interconnect” to existing phone lines where the individual “installs a secondary 
extension into the system from an access point that is selected on the basis of security and 
function” (1991, p.151).  With the proper equipment, one can enter the phone network 
without obtaining an official phone service.  
1. Mobile Telephone 
The mobile telephone eliminates the reliance on stationary terminals and allows 
reasonably unfettered access from anywhere within a cellular network. The increased 
mobility and the sustained connectivity with personnel are decisive to personnel related 
organizations, but create new vulnerabilities. Like other systems that rely on radio waves, 
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the cell phone is easily intercepted and readily pin pointed by direction finding 
equipment. Regardless of the exposure of one’s conversation on a mobile phone, some 
subversives have been able to capitalize on the opportunities provided by the cellular 
technology.   
The mobile phone is dependent 
upon the cellular service and 
the support infrastructure. 
Depending upon the service 
infrastructure, the user can 
easily contact individuals in 
supported areas and even non-
mobile individuals in 
supported areas. 
Elements in the cellular network
can remain mobile but are
connected to the node, phone
number, which they continue to
utilize.  
Figure 7.   Cellular Networks 
Pablo Escobar created a cocaine empire by establishing unchallenged control of 
the Columbian production and the Medellin drug cartel. Escobar and his lieutenants 
relied extensively on coercion, retribution, and the cellular telephone. Escobar who relied 
on “normal hands-on management of the cartel” (Bowden, 2001, p. 117-118) used the 
cell phone extensively to sustain contact with his lieutenants and other personnel. 
Even after his imprisonment, to which his reliance on cell phone usage 
contributed significantly, Escobar continued to run the world’s premier cocaine 
distributorship through a network of cellular and standard phone connections. Though 
continually monitored, Escobar was able to manage the Cartel through his lieutenant and 
other communication techniques that he prioritized according to the needs of security. 
“Pablo was careful about his communications, using the [carrier] pigeons for his most 
important messages” (Bowden, 2001, p.115)2.  
Upon Escobar’s return to the fugitive life, the Columbian authorities initiated a 
massive effort to apprehend and return Escobar to prison. Airborne and ground mobile 
intercept equipment capable of monitoring and triangulating any radio transmission were 
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2 Escobar was not the first subversive to use the pigeon. SOE included pigeons on covert supply drops 
to resistance elements. The drop Zone party would complete the enclosed message and return the carrier to 
Britain to confirm receipt of the cargo. 
employed around the clock while assault forces stood ready to launch and raid his safe 
houses. One of the airborne devices provided by the United States, Centra Spike, could 
intercept and convert multiple vectors into a pinpoint location in a matter of seconds. The 
ground intercept equipment could establish a vector to the source, but required additional 
nodes to attain a pinpoint. Regardless of the resources committed to the pursuit, Escobar 
remained at large and in command of his Cartel. While in prison, Escobar learned to 
adapt his operational procedures to the constraints imposed by the surveillance methods. 
A practice he continued after his escape. Carlos Lehder, a former accomplice turned 
informant provided authorities some insight into Escobar’s habit to increase the 
effectiveness of the pursuit. “Escobar always tries to keep within distance range for his 
cellular phone to reach Medillin’s phone base. That’s approximately 100 miles, so he can 
call any time... occupies the main house with some of his hitmen, radio operator (Big 
High Frequency radio receiver), cooks, whores, and messenger” (Bowden, 2001, p.183). 
Escobar would use multiple phones in an attempt to evade detection and even employed a  
“digital cell phone with scrambling devices, [which took] Centra Spike just fifteen days 
to adapt” (Bowden, 2001, p.171) and intercept. When “conversing on open lines with his 
family or friends, he employed elaborate impromptu codes that required remembering 
specific dates, places, and events” (Bowden, 2001, p.175). When the authorities 
discontinued the cell phone coverage of Medillin, hoping to make Escobar’s 
communication with personnel, friends and family more difficult, “the drug boss just 
switched over to radio or communicated by messenger through a series of couriers so that 
recipient would have no idea where they originated. To ensure that there would be no 
question about the message’s author, Pablo signed with his thumb print” (Bowden, 2001, 
p.175). Even though the cellular networks provide a means of convenience by which to 
conduct business, the system relies on the support of an infrastructure that can be turned 
off in some location if targeted. A link that relies only on the self-contained capacity to 
broadcast a message a great distance directly is the radio.  
C. RADIO 
Despite the radio’s ability to sustain communications independently of other 
infrastructures it is still highly vulnerable to interception and direction finders, as well as 
atmospheric or technical interference. In view of these constraints, transmissions are 
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generally brief and encrypted. Appropriate operating procedures like frequency changes, 
relocation of transmitters, or remote antennas, may reduce the vulnerability of the system 
but can also interfere in the communication process. For many organizations the radio is 
frequently reserved for priority communication between headquarters and its 
subordinates, though it has more universally been used as one-way transmission into 
contested and hostile areas to disseminate information to subordinate elements. As 
discussed previously, the encryption of messages is a requirement to maintain security, 
but has been significantly impeded by the inaccessibility of equipment in hostile areas.  
Radios have seldom been used for an organization’s internal communication when 
couriers were dependable because “monitoring radio transmissions and the use of 
direction finders are easier for the enemy than the interception of couriers who disappear 
among the ... citizens.” (van Dach Bern, 1965, p.118). Despite advances in both the radio 
and radio intercept capabilities, secure use of the radio still requires a dynamic process 
that limits the ability of an adversary to track and locate one’s resources.  
As authorities began to close in on Pablo Escobar, and adversarial gangs 
continued to eliminate his lieutenants and associates Escobar was forced to rely 
exclusively on the radiotelephone for direct communication. The radiotelephone is 
frequently used in maritime operations between ships and shore assets but is a line sight 
instrument that is subject to static and other interference.  Despite the vulnerabilities to 
intercept, the radiophone is easy to use and requires little training. The radiophone 
provides the mobility necessary to maintain freedom and the range to communicate 
throughout the region Escobar operated. The radiophone’s characteristics that make the 
system particularly susceptible to intercept high power and line-of-sight also make it 
ideal for avoiding pursuers. Escobar would contact his family and organization “from the 
back seat of a moving taxi, using a high-powered radio-phone that was linked to a larger 
transmitter that his men constantly moved from place to place” (Bowden, 2001, p.237). 
The highly mobile low profile system could be transported virtually anywhere in Medillin 
with a van, taxi, car or boat. Escobar further complicated the electronic pursuit by 
frequently changing frequencies, which he initiated with coded communications. Escobar 
would tell his son Juan Pablo, “’Let's go up to the next floor,’ or ‘the evening has ended,’ 
it was a signal to shift to a specific frequency” (Bowden, 2000, p.2).  
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The availability of equipment has enhanced the capabilities of the individuals to 
develop a communication system that can adapt to threats. The commonality of radio 
devices in the society has made the items less noticeable. Meyers suggest the use of a 
hand held citizen band radio to receive one-way broadcasts to be retrieved later by the 
element. The radio equipped with the AC adapter uses a plug in timer to activate the 
system during the appropriate window. The message is recorded through a voice-






























The preceding discussion was intended to provide an exposition of the techniques, 
practices, and principles of the clandestine communication system that are necessary for 
the leaders to control, and maintain the organization’s operations as well as the personal 
contributions of the membership. The system’s analysis is not to identify and select an 
optimum route for traffic but to demonstrate that clandestine communication is a process 
composed of various actions, which can easily impede the organization’s communication. 
A subversive relies of a single critical path linking elements because the organization is 
structured in manner that limits the exposure of organizational personnel and the damage 
that can be inflicted in the event of compromise.  “Communication with another 
underground member is the most dangerous activity in clandestine and covert operations” 
(Molnar, 1966, p.103). Establishing boundaries between nodes and relying on a switching 
process to sustain communication throughout the organization control this danger. The 
switches metaphor for clandestine tradecraft is not to suggest that every communication 
transfer relies on a combined series of nodes to connect two individuals at the opposite 
end of the organization, though that is sometimes the case, but to demonstrate the relative 
difficulty of balancing communication and security. The ability to sustain a throughput 
substantial enough to disseminate orders, ideology, and rewards is a factor of the systems 
that can readily constrain the organization’s ability to adapt to the environment.  
The subversive survives in an environment with constantly changing political, 
economic, social, and personal situations. The dynamics and complexity of the 
environment increase the demand for accurate, timely, and useable information. The 
constraints imposed by the security environment significantly limit the development of a 
responsive communication system and increase the uncertainty within which decisions 
must be made. To better cope with this uncertainty the organization is structured to 
reduce the demand for information and incorporate slack resources into the decision and 
planning process. This slack resource is time.  
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The connectivity and relations that support timely reliable information flow are a 
detriment to the subversive. The greater the density of communication channels in a 
subversive element, the greater the reachability of any member either directly or 
indirectly. The organization is forced to rely on single channels and multiple switches to 
route correct information to the appropriate individual. These switches not only deliver 
information but also establish boundaries that separate important nodes, i.e. the 
individuals that are necessary to sustain the movement. The organization accepts that 
information is slow and the necessity to adapt great. To prevent the failure of a single 
node from compromising the entire organization, that node remains afar from the 
leadership and easily cut off. The Hollywood depiction of every individual rushing to 
save the lives of a compromised cell is correct in depicting one’s empathy for the 
compromised individual, but for the well-constructed organization, the penetration is 
insignificant to the organization’s survival. The fate of the movement does not hinge on 
the ability of one to sustain him/herself through hours of interrogation but on the belief 
that no individual outside of an isolated cell can be reached in a timely manner. The 
organization survives by the fact that those individuals know only what is within their 
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